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Abstract
This paper investigates how the labor market institutions that characterize most of the Euro-
pean countries a®ect the integration process of younger workers on the labor market. We argue
that young workers have private information about their abilities when entering the labor mar-
ket. However, this information asymmetry does not prevail as the production process reveals the
worker's type. Adverse selection distorts hiring practices at the labor market entry. We develop
a dynamic principal-agent model and ¯rst derive the optimal menu of labor contracts employers
can use as a self-selection mechanism. Firms o®er an increasing wage to high-productive workers
while a °atter wage pro¯le to low-productive workers. Our theory suggests that a high level of
¯ring costs as well as the presence of a minimum wage prevent employers from o®ering separating
contracts to new entrants and thus contribute to the time-consuming integration process of youth.
Finally, we provide numerical exercises to illustrate our theoretical ¯ndings on the optimal wage
pro¯le and to assess the consequences for employment opportunities.
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11 Introduction
One of the assumptions that drives e±ciency of competitive labor markets is that ¯rms and workers
have perfect information about the quality of a match, ¯rm's or worker's productivity. In reality,
labor markets operate in an environment where there is incomplete information. Economists have
concerned themselves with the optimal employment contract under incomplete information since the
seminal papers of (Lazear E.P. 1981) and (Shapiro C. and Stiglitz J.E. 1984). The optimal wage dy-
namics concern arose as the empirical evidence has suggested for many years that the wage increases
with job tenure for a given productivity. The theoretical analysis of (Salop J. and Salop S. 1976)
had already provided some explanations. The authors suggested that ¯rms discourage individuals
characterized by a high propensity to quit the job by increasing the wage with job tenure. (Harris
M. and Holmstrom B. 1982) argued that the optimal wage pro¯le is increasing as both ¯rms and
workers gradually learn about workers' ability by observing the output produced over time. The au-
thors considered incomplete but symmetric information about workers' abilities. One can argue that
adverse selection may arise in the labor market when workers have private information about their
productivity, trainability or preferences. Hiring a worker can be risky as less desirable workers have
an incentive to overstate their quali¯cations. Firms are thus induced to design a screening device
to reveal the worker's type. There is no empirical evidence suggesting that ¯rms do not implement
self-selection mechanisms as separating employment contracts to induce the worker to reveal his type
by his behavior. Recently, (Guerrieri V., Shimer R. and Wright R. 2009) extended the competitive
search equilibrium model of (Moen E.R 1997) to environments with adverse selection. They show that
equilibrium exists where ¯rms o®er separating contracts to which di®erent types of workers direct their
search. Pooling contracts will not increase ¯rms' pro¯t.
This paper supports the idea that labor markets operate in an environment where adverse selec-
tion appears mainly at the labor market entry, thus making the hiring of new entrants risky. We
propose a dynamic principal-agent model to derive the optimal menu of separating labor contracts
¯rms implement to induce self-selection from workers of di®erent abilities. Our main contribution is
then to analyze how the labor market institutions that characterized most of the European countries,
namely high ¯ring costs and minimum wage, a®ect the optimal wage pro¯le or prevent ¯rms from
implementing a menu of separating contracts. Besides, we rely on a standard matching model µ a la
Pissarides to analyze the consequences on job creation decisions and employment at the labor market
entry. The analysis we perform suggests that both adverse selection and labor market institutions
contribute to the time-consuming integration process of youth on the labor market.
Young workers entering the labor market have usually either never worked or had few contacts
with employers. While the new entrants may know their own level of ability, the hiring ¯rms could not
be able to perfectly observe it before engaging in production. The signaling theory ((Spence M. 1973))
argues that education can be used as a signal of high levels of abilities to the ¯rm thereby narrowing
2the informational gap. But workers may still be unequally productive in employment within the same
quali¯cation level. However, the asymmetry of information should not prevail on the labor market.
Typically, ¯rms infer the ability of their workers by observing the output they produce. (Farber H.
and Gibbons R. 1996) use longitudinal data and ¯nd that the in°uence of abilities on wages increases
with workers' experience thus providing empirical evidence on employers learning. But most of the
empirical studies ((Schoenberg U. 2007), (Schweri J. and Mueller B. 2008)) conclude that employer
learning is symmetric. The worker's employment experience, as the unemployment history should
indicate a certain level of productivity. For instance, long-term unemployment is usually associated
with a loss of human capital thus leading to stigmatization of job seekers and to discrimination from
employers. This paper assumes accordingly that ¯rms do not have superior information regarding its
employees'abilities relative to other ¯rms: they learn both about the abilities of their own employees
and about that of the other workers. We thus distinguish new entrants who have private information
about their abilities and experienced workers who has been previously revealed in employment.
Our ¯rst contribution is to analyze the optimal wage dynamics under adverse selection at the
labor market entry. While o®ering a constant wage is an optimal decision under full information,
we show that ¯rms o®er an increasing wage to high-productive workers but a °atter wage pro¯le to
low-productive workers. The wage is usually downward rigid, but ¯rms have the possibility to ¯re the
workers who did not choose the contract designed for them. Bad workers are not induced to shirk as
they will be dismissed before gaining access to the highest wage level o®ered to good workers. One
should notice that (Hagedorn M., Kaul A. and Mennel T. 2002) found similar results when deriving
the optimal unemployment bene¯ts pro¯le under adverse selection: decreasing bene¯ts are designed
to good searchers while the optimal pro¯le designed for bad searchers is °atter.
Further, we propose to analyze the interactions between discrimination and Employment Protec-
tion Legislation (EPL). By EPL, we refer to regulations concerning ¯ring costs. The reduction of
¯ring costs has often been advocated by economists to favor hirings of young workers. (Pries M. and
Rogerson R. 2005) developed a learning model in which ¯rms and workers have incomplete information
about match's quality. They argued that ¯ring costs induce ¯rms to be more selective in whom they
hire and prevent them from sorting bad matches. High level of EPL should a®ect self-selection mech-
anisms in an environment where adverse selection operates by preventing the ¯rm from dismissing
shirkers.
Our analysis is performed in two stages. First, to derive analytical results we investigate the optimal
menu of contracts under the assumption that the wage is constant over time. We show that in the
absence of any ¯ring costs, the ¯rm is able to implement a menu of separating contracts that gives to
low-productive workers an information rent, as standard in the theory of incentives. The EPL does
not a®ect the labor contract until a threshold value. Then, for intermediate values of ¯ring costs,
the previous contract no longer allows ¯rms to dismiss bad workers who did not choose the contract
designed for them. However, a menu of separating contracts can still be implemented. The ¯rm faces
3a trade-o® between increasing the wage designed for good workers in order to allow for the dismissal
of bad mismatched workers and thus to implement a menu of contracts, or implementing a pooling
contract that gives bad workers a higher information rent. Finally, for the highest levels of EPL, ¯rms
are unable to design a self-selection mechanism which strongly reduces the employment opportunities
at the labor market entry.
Further, we investigate numerically how the EPL and the minimum wage a®ect the optimal wage
pro¯les of a menu of contracts. A dynamic wage pro¯le gives ¯rms more °exibility in presence of
¯ring costs. Indeed, the incentive for bad workers to accept the contract designed for them comes
from the possibility to be dismissed if they do not. When the wage is constant, the ¯rm decides either
to ¯re or to retain the mismatched worker once observed the worker's ability. On the contrary, for an
increasing wage pro¯le, the worker could be dismissed later in employment, so that the punishment
remains even in the presence of ¯ring costs. The quantitative analysis suggests that the lowest levels
of the EPL do not a®ect the optimal menu of contracts, while for the highest levels ¯rms are unable
to implement separating contracts. For intermediate values, the optimal wage pro¯le designed for
bad workers becomes slightly increasing. The ¯rm still o®ers an increasing wage to good workers but
with a higher growth rate and a lower initial wage in order to allow for dismissal and reduce the bad
worker's incentives to shirk. Finally, we show that the presence of a minimum wage combined with a
strict employment protection legislation prevents the implementation of separating contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the model. Section 3 presents the
optimal contracts designed for experienced workers whose ability is perfectly known. In section 4 we
derive the optimal menu of contracts under adverse selection at the labor market entry. We develop
more detailed properties for the case with a constant wage. Section 5 presents the job creation decisions
and employment dynamics. Finally, in section 6 we solve numerically a version of model computed
above French data and investigate quantitatively how labor market institutions a®ect the optimal
wage pro¯le and labor market outcomes.
42 The Model: Basic assumptions
This section describes our framework. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model to investigate the
di±culties that arise when ¯rms implement employment contracts under incomplete information and
strict Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). By EPL, we refer to regulations concerning ¯ring
costs. The ultimate concern of the paper is to analyze how the labor market institutions a®ect the
youth integration process by restraining ¯rms in their labor contract's design. To feature the labor
market entry process and job creation decisions, we thus rely on a standard matching model µ a la
(Pissarides C. 2000) that integrates labor market frictions. It allows us to analyze the elasticity of the
average entry unemployment duration with respect to the wage contract and then to the EPL. We do
not investigate how a wage contracts could internalize the externalities associated with the matching
process.
2.1 The environment:
There is a continuum of agents of measure one, who are either employed workers specialized in pro-
duction or unemployed workers specialized in job search. We focus on the ¯rst years of employment
on the labor market. Workers starting their working life are assumed to have the same education level
but di®er in their abilities. These di®erences are expressed by the output they produce in employment:
y = fyB;yGg with yG > yB. The output re°ects the worker's capabilities: a low-productive worker
is not able to produce yG, independently of his e®ort. On-the-job e®ort and moral hazard issues will
not be considered.
In each period, new workers enter the labor market as unemployed and search for a job. They are
initially better informed about their abilities than employers while the fraction Ã of G-type entrants
producing yG is common knowledge. The ¯rm has to experience the new worker to evaluate his ca-
pabilities. However, the information asymmetry does not prevail on the labor market: once engaged
in a match, the ¯rm observes the output °ow produced by the worker and thus reveals his type after
¯rst producing. Following the empirical ¯nding of (Schoenberg U. 2007) and (Schweri J. and Mueller
B. 2008), we assume that the employer learning on worker's ability is symmetric. Firms learn both
about the abilities of their own employees and about that of the other workers: the information is
perfectly shared on the labor market. Once separated from their jobs, workers who have been revealed
fall into the unemployment pool and do not have private information anymore. We thus distinguish
two populations: new entrants and young revealed workers.
By assuming that new entrants have private information about their abilities that will be revealed
in the employment relationship, we implicitly consider that young people never worked before their
labor market entry. One can argue that this assumption is not consistent with the empirical evidence.
Indeed, there is some kind of gradual labor market entry partly due to apprenticeship programmes
and implying combinations of learning and working among young people within the European Union,
((OECD 1996a)). Similarly, the learning process on workers' abilities must be time-consuming and
5based on the past information, as modeled by the learning theory ((Jovanovic B. 1979), (Harris M.
and Holmstrom B. 1982)). The assumptions we adopt are a matter of convenience and allow us to
easily compare the case with adverse selection with the full-information case.
The basic environment borrows from the matching model µ a la (Pissarides C. 2000). The labor
market is a®ected by search frictions so that searching for a job and searching for a worker are costly
and time-consuming activities. In equilibrium, both vacancies and unemployment coexist. Firms
are allowed to segment their search. Vacancies are o®ered either to new entrants whose type is not
perfectly known, or to experienced workers whose type has already been revealed. We distinguish two
main segments:
• At the labor market entry, job creation °ows are driven by a constant return to scale matching
function m(uE;vE), with uE the mass of new entrants and vE the rate of vacancies directed to
new entrants. The probability for the ¯rm to ¯ll a position and the probability for a new entrant
to ¯nd a job are given respectively by q(µE) =
m(uE;vE)
vE and p(µE) =
m(uE;vE)
uE , with µE = vE
uE the
labor market entry tightness. From the standard properties of the matching function, we have
q0(µE) < 0 and p0(µE) > 0.
• On a second segment, ¯rms are free to post vacancies either to G-type or to B-type experienced
workers who have been revealed. Workers and ¯rms are matched together according to a standard
matching function m(ui
R;vi
R) for i = fB;Gg with ui
R and vi
R denoting respectively the mass of
revealed i-type unemployed workers and the rate of vacancies posted to i-type workers. The









. We have q0(µi
R) < 0 and p0(µi
R) > 0.
We di®er from the basic theory of incentives by integrating an endogenous probability to ¯nd a
job. It positively depends on the labor demand and negatively on the mass of unemployed workers.
Workers ¯nd a job more easily when there are more jobs relative to job seekers competing for the
o®ered vacancies. Similarly, ¯rms are allowed to direct their search only to i-type revealed workers.
In consequence, the matching process at the labor market entry integrates externalities associated
with non-segmented search. It is straightforward that new entrants will ¯nd a job more easily when
there are more good workers (for higher values of Ã). The search externalities pay a central role in the
standard matching model. One could investigate how to internalize them in order to reach the e±cient
allocation. This is not the concern of our paper. The probability p(µE) will give us the average un-
employment duration at the labor market entry under adverse selection, measured by 1=p(µE), while
probabilities p(µi
R) will give us the average unemployment duration of experienced workers under full
information. The comparison between those two measures will allow us to investigate the evolution
of employment prospects at the labor market entry under information asymmetry depending on the
labor contract and on labor market institutions.
6The basic time of event is the following: a match formed in t becomes productive in t + 1. Once
job separation occurs, ¯rms and workers are allowed to search next period. The labor market is
represented as follows:






















where ¯ < 1 is the discount factor and ct the consumption. Agents are risk-adverse. We adopt the





with ¾ the relative risk aversion parameter. As is standard, the function u is increasing and concave.
There is no savings so that employees consume their labor income w while job searchers of type i
enjoy some real return bi = byi. As standard, bi integrates unemployment insurance bene¯ts and a
measure of home production. It is thus assumed to be indexed to the worker's ability.
2.3 The ¯rms' problem:
There is a continuum of identical ¯rms which objective is twofold.
The number of jobs is endogenously determined by free entry conditions: ¯rms post employment
7positions on the labor market at a cost c by unit of time until any incremental pro¯t is exhausted.
Besides, at the time of meeting, the employer o®ers a labor contract to the worker. All jobs are
assumed to be hit by an idiosyncratic shock that render them unproductive at rate s. Then, given
the exogenous job separation process, the contract speci¯es both the level of the labor income and its
evolution for the whole employment period. Although a continuum of values for a wage wt is perhaps
most realistic, for simplicity it is assumed here that there are only two values. The labor contract is
de¯ned by an initial wage w1 moving to w2 with rate ¸. The ¯rm not only designs the two wage levels
but also the rate at which a worker can be promoted. Thereafter, we refer to the period of employment
during which the worker gets w1 as "employment at ¯rst stage", and to the period during which the
worker gets w2 as "employment at second stage". As usual, ¯rms are risk neutral and discount future
°ows at the same rate as the workers. The ¯rm's problem di®ers according to the information they
have at the time of meeting.
2.3.1 Full information: the experienced workers
Hiring an experienced worker is not risky as their ability is perfectly known. The ¯rm o®ers a labor







The subscribe j = fb;gg denotes the contracts designed for agents of type B and G respectively. The
optimal contract is the one that maximizes the expected-discounted pro¯t of the ¯lled job and at
least guarantees to workers the gain from unemployment so as to ensure their participation. When
designing the labor contract, the ¯rm takes the labor market tightness as given.
2.3.2 Adverse selection: the labor market entry
Firms have di±culties in observing the true ability of heterogenous workers at the labor market entry.
Private information creates problems for both workers and ¯rms. Firms want to be able to identify the
workers' type so as to remunerate them according to the output they produce and to their reservation
wage. On the other hand, high productive workers do not want to compete against low productive
ones.
As most of the European countries are characterized by downward wage rigidities, we follow (Bai
C. 1997) and consider that the wages cannot be contingent on the ability's observation. Optimal
contracts will be thus analyzed under full commitment. However, we integrate the possibility for the
¯rm to dismiss a worker who has been revealed by paying a ¯ring cost F. The level F determines
the strictness of the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). The output yG is assumed to be such
that ¯rms will never be induced to ¯re high-productive workers while the dismissal of low-productive
workers depends on the o®ered wage and on the level of ¯ring costs. Job destruction °ows are driven
by both an exogenous and an endogenous process.
8Two types of contracts are considered. The separating contract is characterized by a menu of labor
contracts the employers can use as a self-selection mechanism to reveal the worker's ability. The pooling
contract is o®ered by employers who are not allowed or able to discriminate. The two contracts are
de¯ned as follows:
• Pooling contract:
The labor contract speci¯es a single wage pro¯le o®ered to both G-type and B-type entrants
but an endogenous separation probability that depends on the worker's ability:
fw1;e;w2;e;¸e;d(yi)g
The optimal wage pro¯le is the one that maximizes the average expected pro¯t of a job and
ensures the worker's participation. When designing the labor contract, the ¯rm takes the labor
market tightness as given.
Separations with high-productive workers are only driven by the exogenous process: d(yG) = 0.
The ¯rm decides whether or not to retain a worker who is revealed to be low-productive accord-
ing to ¯ring costs and to the wage level. If the worker is retained, the endogenous separation
rate, under the condition that the job is not exogenously destructed, is d(yB) = 0. If the worker
is laid o®, the employment relationship ends at the output observation, d(yB) = 1. However,
as the wage can vary over time, the employer has the possibility to dismiss a B-type worker
either at stage 1 or at stage 2 of employment. The endogenous separation probability is given
by respectively d(yB) = (1¡¸e) and d(yB) = ¸e, (Recall that a job starts at level w1 and moves
to level w2 with rate ¸e). As ¯ring costs are known at the time of meeting, so is the value of
d(yi) and the average employment duration.
• Separating contract:
The ¯rm o®ers a menu of contracts that induces self selection from workers. It speci¯es a wage
pro¯le j = fg;bg designed for G-type or B-type workers as well as an endogenous separation






e;dj(yi)g for j = fb;gg
Workers who chose the right contract will not be ¯red, unless the job is hit by a shock at rate s.
On the contrary, in case of mismatch, the ¯rm decides whether or not to retain the worker once





The optimal menu of contracts is the one that maximizes the average expected pro¯t of a job,
ensures the worker's participation and the worker's selection of the contract that was designed
for him. When designing the labor contract, the ¯rm takes the labor market tightness as given.
As stated previously, we assume that the wage's level cannot be contingent on the ability's obser-
vation while the dismissal probability is. In consequence, when a menu of contracts is implemented,
9a bad worker who chose the contract designed for good workers cannot face a wage's reduction but
can be dismissed once revealed according to the strictness of the EPL. One can argue that this is a
strong assumption that reduces the ¯rm's °exibility when designing labor contracts. It is. Moreover,
it should not be optimal: a worker might prefer, as the ¯rm, a wage reduction instead of separation.
However, it allows us to investigate how features of the European labor market institutions as wage
rigidities and EPL a®ect the implementation of separating contracts.
Next, as only two wage levels are assumed, we constrain the ¯rm in the optimal wage pro¯le's design.
Therefore, the e®ects of the EPL should be overestimated. The aim of the paper is mainly to give the
intuition of the impact of the EPL on wage pro¯les and its implications on the labor market entry
process. To deepen the analysis, we should investigate the optimal continuous wage wt.
We now turn to investigate the e®ects of the labor market institutions as the EPL and the minimum
wage on the optimal menu of contracts and analyze both under which conditions a menu of contracts
could be implement and will be preferred to a pooling contract from the ¯rm's point of view. Recall
that the optimal wage contracts are derived for a given labor market tightness. Section 5 presents the
job creation decisions and numerical exercises will allow us to provide a general equilibrium analysis
with µE and µi
R endogenously determined.
3 The optimal labor contracts under full-information:
The segment of experienced workers
Firms perfectly observe the type of experienced workers and thus o®er at the time of meeting, a labor
contract j that maximizes the expected return of a job ¦
j
1;r while ensuring the participation of workers.





1;r = yi ¡ w
j











Current period pro¯ts are (yi ¡ w
j
1;r). Jobs are exogenously destructed with rate s. As there is
free entry, the expected value of a vacant post reduces to zero. If the job is not destructed and if
employment evolves to stage 2 with rate ¸
j





2;r = yi ¡ w
j
2;r + ¯(1 ¡ s)¦
j
2;r (4)
Similarly we derive the expected values to a i-type revealed worker of unemployment and employment,
under the condition that the worker accepts the labor contract o®ered by the ¯rm:
Ui































R + ¯(1 ¡ s)V
j
2;r (7)





























R. Given our assumption on the utility function, the complete information optimal contracts
are:
wg
r = bG and wb
r = bB




The ¯rm's problem resolution is provided in Appendix 8.1.
4 The optimal wage pro¯le under adverse selection:
The labor market entry
If there is no information asymmetry, the distinction between new entrants and experienced workers no
longer holds. The optimal contracts under full information are such that all workers obtain the same
utility level of their outside option: w
g
e = bG and wb
e = bB. In the presence of adverse selection, the
optimal contract is usually a separating menu of contracts that elicits the worker's private information
by giving up some information rent. In his maximization problem, the ¯rm has to guarantee both
participation and incentive compatibility due to adverse selection. The job o®er must be such that
only workers who truly possess the abilities they claim to possess would accept the job. The ¯rm's

















































11As the worker's ability is revealed after ¯rst producing, the ¯rm has to ensure that the value of
employment both at stage 1 and 2 is higher than the value of revealed unemployment, Ui
R. Under full
commitment, a worker who accepts the contract j at the time of meeting is not allowed to renegotiate
when evolution to w
j
2;e occurs. The incentive constraints then specify that the expected employment
value V
i;j
1;e with i = j has to be higher than the expected employment value associated with mismatch,
V
i;j
1;e with i 6= j. This value is an expected one which thus integrates the evolution to employment at
stage 2 with rate ¸
j
e.
The values of employment to the ¯rm and to the worker for the case where workers choose the
contract designed for them, i = j, satisfy:
¦
i;j
1;e = yi ¡ w
j













2;e = yi ¡ w
j
























R + ¯(1 ¡ s)V
i;j
2;e (12)
Recall that according to the free entry condition, the value of a vacancy reduces to zero in equilibrium.
As the agent's type is revealed after ¯rst producing, the ¯rm identi¯es a mismatch if the worker did
not choose the contract designed for him. Employers decide whether or not to dismiss mismatched
workers according to the level of ¯ring costs and to the wage contract. Thus the expected employment
values to the mismatched worker depends on the ¯rm's separation decision. We now turn to analyze
the incentive constraints.
4.1 The incentive constraints
The expected value of a job paid w
j
1;e and occupied by a mismatched worker is given by:
¦
j;i
1;e = yi ¡ w
j

















Recall that i denotes the worker's type and j the contract's type. For the mismatch case, we have
i 6= j. The ¯rm gets current pro¯ts yi¡w
j
1;e. At the end of the period, if evolution to the second level
of wage w
j
2;e occurs with rate ¸
j
e, the ¯rm decides to retain the mismatched worker on employment
only if ¦
j;i
2;e ¸ ¡F. The expected pro¯t ¦
j;i




2;e = yi ¡ w
j
2;e + ¯(1 ¡ s)¦
j;i
2;e (14)
12Now if evolution to w
j
2;e does not occur, the ¯rm decides to retain the mismatched worker on employ-
ment only if ¦
0j;i
1;e ¸ ¡F. The expected pro¯t under job continuation at ¯rst stage is given by:
¦
0j;i
1;e = yi ¡ w
j















The ¯ring decision at ¯rst stage obviously depends on the decision that will be taken at the second
stage of employment. We distinguish four cases according to the ¯rm's separation decision:
1. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker once he is revealed. The separation probability is thus 1.
2. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker only at second stage of employment, for w
j
2;e. The sepa-
ration probability is s + (1 ¡ s)¸
j
e.
3. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker only at ¯rst stage of employment, for w
j
1;e. The separation
probability is s + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ¸
j
e).
4. The ¯rm retains the mismatched worker. Destructions are only driven by the exogenous process
with rate s.
Let us now derive the conditions under which each case emerges and the corresponding expected
employment values to a mismatched worker.
1. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker once he is revealed
This case occurs when the expected pro¯ts of employment are such that
¦
i;j
2;e · ¡F and ¦
0i;j
1;e · ¡F
The worker is thus dismissed whatever the stage of employment. According to equation 14, we
de¯ne a threshold wage value such that ¦
i;j
2;e = ¡F:
^ wj = yi + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F (16)
The mismatched worker is dismissed at stage 2 of employment if w
j
2;e ¸ ^ wj. Now given that the






1;e ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)¸
j
eF
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ¸
j
e)
Similarly, we show that w
j
1;e ¸ ^ wj entails ¦
0i;j
1;e · ¡F. To conclude, a wage contract such that
w
j
1;e ¸ ^ wj and w
j
2;e ¸ ^ wj
allows ¯rms to dismiss the mismatched worker once revealed.







132. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker only at the second stage of employment
This case occurs when the expected pro¯ts of employment are such that
¦
i;j
2;e · ¡F and ¦
0i;j
1;e > ¡F
In consequence, a wage contract such that
w
j
1;e ¸ ^ wj and w
j
2;e < ^ wj
allows the ¯rm to retain a mismatched worker at ¯rst stage but to ¯re him once evolution to
w
j




1;e. The expected value
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e]Ui




3. The ¯rm ¯res the mismatched worker only at the ¯rst stage of employment
This case occurs when the expected pro¯ts of employment are such that
¦
i;j





2;e · ^ wj entails ¦
i;j
2;e > ¡F. Given that the job continuation is an optimal











1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ¸
j
e)
According to this expression, we de¯ne a threshold wage value such that ¦
0i;j
1;e = ¡F:










One should notice that ~ wj > ^ wj. We show that the case where ¦
i;j
2;e > ¡F and ¦
0i;j
1;e · ¡F
emerges for a wage contract such that:
w
j
2;e · ^ wj and w
j
1;e ¸ ~ wj > ^ wj
Contrary to the second case, this situation requires a decreasing wage contract. The ¯rm will
retain the worker only with a wage reduction that occurs at rate ¸
j
e. Numerical exercises will
show that this case never emerges in equilibrium. The expected values of employment for a




1;e) + ¯[s + (1 ¡ s)(1 ¡ ¸j
e)]Ui







2;e) + ¯(1 ¡ s)V
i;j
2;e (21)
144. The ¯rm retains the mismatched worker:
Finally, this last case occurs when the expected pro¯ts of employment are such that
¦
i;j
2;e > ¡F and ¦
0i;j
1;e > ¡F
A wage contract such that
w
j
2;e · ^ wj and w
j
1;e ¸ ~ wj
does not allow the ¯rm to dismiss the mismatched worker. The expected values of employment



















2;e) + ¯(1 ¡ s)V
i;j
2;e (23)
Recall that the level of the EPL is common knowledge. At the time of meeting, the ¯rm o®ers
a menu of labor contracts that speci¯es both the wage dynamic and the dismissal probability for
mismatched workers. The dismissal represents a sanction that induces the worker to accept the con-
tract designed for him. It is straightforward that G-type workers should not be induced to choose
the b-type contract but if they do, they will not be ¯red: The fourth case systematically emerges for
fi = G;j = bg.
Let us consider mismatch arising when low-productive workers accepting the contract designed for G-
type workers, fi = B;j = gg. Implementing a menu of contracts such that both wage levels designed
for G-type workers are higher than the threshold ^ wg enables self-selection from B-type workers, (c.f.
¯rst case). The threshold ^ wj is increasing in the level of ¯ring costs: the higher the ¯ring costs, the





low enough to get a positive expected pro¯t of a match with a G-type worker, ¦
G;g
1;e . We thus expect
the ¯rst case to emerge for low EPL. The optimal wage contract under adverse selection should be
characterized by a menu of separating contracts. On the contrary, the fourth case should emerge for
high EPL. High levels of ¯ring costs require that the ¯rm o®ers a higher value of w
g
e to be able to
dismiss mismatched workers. If the wage contract is such that ¦
G;g
1;e < 0, the EPL prevents ¯rms from
dismissing mismatched workers and thus from implementing a menu of separating contracts. The
optimal wage contract under adverse selection should be characterized by a pooling contract o®ered
to both types of workers.
O®ering a constant transfer is an optimal decision under full information but may not be under
adverse selection. The seminal papers of (Lazear E.P. 1981) and (Harris M. and Holmstrom B. 1982)
provided theoretical support to an upward slopping wage-job tenure pro¯le. We expect the optimal
wage pro¯le designed for good workers to be increasing while ¯rms should o®er to bad workers a
15°atter wage. Allowing for a time-varying wage increases ¯rm's °exibility and gives room for imple-
menting a menu of separating contracts even with high ¯ring costs. Indeed, ¯ring costs impede the
dismissal of low-productive shirkers. But the ¯rm can modify the wage pro¯le designed for good
workers to keep the punishments if bad workers do not choose the right contract. By strongly reduc-
ing the initial wage w
g
1;e and increasing the second wage level w
g
2;e, the ¯rm remains able to dismiss
mismatched workers at the second stage of employment. The dismissal probability falls from 1 to
¸
g
e. The threat point of the ¯rm is thus lower than in the absence of ¯ring costs but higher than
for the highest levels of EPL. Typically, we expect the ¯ring costs to gradually reduce the dismissal
probability from 1, to ¸
g
e and ¯nally to 0, so that the ¯rst, second and fourth cases emerge accordingly.
A parameterized version of the model will be solved numerically in the last section so as to deter-
mine the optimal wage contract under adverse selection according to the the labor market institutions
that characterized most of the European countries: high level of EPL and minimum wage. To ac-




1;e ¸ ¹ w and w
j
2;e ¸ ¹ w 8 j = fb;gg
The minimum wage could prevent ¯rms from reducing the initial wage w
g
1;e in presence of ¯ring costs,
thereby making impossible the implementation of a menu of separating contracts.
In order to derive analytical results and to highlight the main e®ects of the EPL, we propose to
solve the ¯rm's problem for a constant wage w
j
e, thus setting ¸
j
e = 0. It is straightforward that the
¯rm's dismissal decision becomes binary: the mismatched worker is either laid o® with probability 1,
or retained with exogenous rate (1 ¡ s). The two intermediate cases cannot emerge anymore, thus
reducing room for the designing of self-selection mechanisms.
4.2 The case with a constant wage: wj
e
Assume that the menu of labor contracts o®ered to new entrants speci¯es a constant wage, w
j
e. The
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and to the adverse selection incentive constraints
V G;g
e ¸ V G;b
e (ICG)
V B;g
e ¸ V B;g
e (ICB)
16The expected values of employment to a ¯rm and to a worker who accepts the contract designed for
him (for i = j) satisfy:
¦i;j
e = yi ¡ wj





R + ¯(1 ¡ s)V i;j
e (25)
Once engaged in production, mismatched workers are identi¯ed. The expected value of a job
occupied by a i-type mismatched worker (for i 6= j) is given by:
¦i;j
e = yi ¡ wj






The worker will be retained on the contract he accepted only if the expected pro¯t under job contin-
uation is higher than the ¯ring cost: ¦
0i;j
e ¸ ¡F, with:
¦0i;j
e = yi ¡ wj
e + ¯(1 ¡ s)¦0i;j
e (27)
4.2.1 The incentive constraints
Two cases emerge depending on the labor contract and on the value of ¯ring costs, F:
1. If the expected pro¯t of employment is such that ¦
0i;j
e · ¡F, the ¯rm decides to ¯re the
mismatched worker. According to equation 27, this case occurs when the wage contract is
such that
wj
e ¸ yi + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F




R for i 6= j (28)
2. If the expected pro¯t of employment is such that ¦
i;j
e ¸ ¡F, the ¯rm decides to retain the
mismatched worker. In consequence, for a wage contract such that
wj
e · yi + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
¯rms will be unable to dismiss a mismatched worker. The expected value of employment for a




R + ¯(1 ¡ s)V i;j
e for i 6= j (29)
We de¯ne the reservation threshold of the wage above which the mismatched worker will be ¯red as:
^ wj = yi + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F for i 6= j (30)
It is straightforward that G-type workers who choose the contract designed for B-type workers will
be retained so that the ¯rst case never emerges3. Indeed, the ¯rm o®ers a wage wb
e · yB in order
3There should be no incentive for high-productive workers to choose the b-type wage. However, the value V
G;b
e has
to be derived in order to solve the ¯rm's problem.
17to get an expected pro¯t ¦
B;b
e ¸ 0. Then, the wage wb
e is necessarily lower than the threshold
^ wb = yG + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F so that ¦
G;b
e ¸ ¡F.





e ¸ 0, so that the dismissal of B-type mismatched workers is possible if ^ wg < w
g
e · yG The
threshold ^ wg increases with ¯ring costs. High EPL impedes the dismissal of B-type mismatched
workers thus preventing ¯rms from implementing separating contracts.
4.2.2 The optimal separating contracts
We derive the optimal labor contracts the ¯rm o®ers according to the strictness of the EPL. The
resolution is provided in Appendix 8.2 and yields to the following set of propositions:
Proposition 2 For a low level of ¯ring costs:
F · ¹ F1 with ¹ F1 =
bG ¡ yB
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
The optimal menu of contracts that elicit workers' private information entails:
• The same utility as unemployed for G-type worker, u(w
g
e) = u(bG). Given our assumptions on
the utility function: w
g
e = bG. The optimal wage designed for G-type workers under adverse
selection is similar to the one under full information.
• A positive information rent to the B-type worker: u(wb
e) > u(bB). The wage satis¯es:
u(wb
e) = u(bG) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(bG) ¡ u(bB)]
Our ¯ndings in the absence of ¯ring costs are standard results. The optimal wage contract under
adverse selection is such that the participation constraint is saturated for high-productive workers
while the ¯rm has to give up some information rent to low-productive workers in order to elicit the
worker's private information. Thus, the incentive constraint is saturated only for B-type workers. The
information rent B-type workers get provides them an additional utility:
u(wb
e) ¡ u(bB) = [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)][u(bG) ¡ u(bB)]
According to equation 30, this contract can be implemented for F · ¹ F1, which would ensure that
w
g
e > ^ wg:
bG > yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
Firms proceed with the dismissal of B-type mismatched workers once revealed. The analysis sug-
gests that for low values of F, the optimal contract under adverse selection is able to induce B-type
workers to accept the contract designed for them. Only B-type workers get an information rent. An
increase in ¯ring costs such that F remains lower than ¹ F1 does not a®ect the optimal menu of contracts.
18Proposition 3 For an intermediate level of ¯ring costs:
¹ F1 < F · ¹ F2 with ¹ F2 =
yG ¡ yB
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
The optimal menu of contracts that elicits workers' private information entails:
• A positive information rent to the G-type worker: u(w
g
e) > u(bG). The wage satis¯es:
wg
e = ^ wg =) wg
e = yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F < yG
• A positive information rent to the B-type worker: u(wb
e) > u(bB). The wage satis¯es:
u(wb
e) = u(wg
e) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(wg
e) ¡ u(bB)]
On the contrary, for intermediate values of F, a wage contract w
g
e = bG will induce B-type workers to
choose the contract designed for G-type workers as they will not be dismissed. Indeed, according to
the threshold ¹ F1, ¯ring costs such that F > ¹ F1 entails bG > yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s]F. Then, the wage w
g
e
will be lower than the threshold value ^ w
g
e (equation 30) preventing ¯rms from dismissing mismatched
workers. As a result, ¯rms have to o®er w
g
e > bG in order to drive the expected pro¯t ¦
B;g
e under
the value of ¯ring costs and to remain able to dismiss mismatched workers: the implementation of
a menu of separating contracts thus requires a reduction of ¦
G;g
e to prevent mismatch. Firms have
to give up some information rent to both types of workers. The optimal wage is w
g
e = ^ wg and the
incentive constraint of B-type workers remains saturated. To sum up, high productive workers receive
a constant wage w
g
e = bG, whatever the value of ¯ring costs as long as F < ¹ F1 while the wage w
g
e
increases with ¯ring costs for ¹ F1 < F · ¹ F2. The higher the ¯ring costs in the range of [ ¹ F1; ¹ F2], the
higher the information rent.
Proposition 4 For a high level of ¯ring costs:
F > ¹ F2
The optimal contract is a single value of we that gives all workers the same utility as G-type unem-
ployment. Given our assumptions on the utility function, the optimal wage is we = bG. It entails:
• The same utility as unemployed for G-type worker, u(we) = u(bG). The optimal wage designed
for G-type workers under adverse selection is similar to the one under full information.
• A positive information rent to the B-type worker: we > bB.
For a level of ¯ring costs higher than the discounted di®erence of outputs, F > ¹ F2, the level of the
threshold ^ wg now exceeds the output yG. In order to get ¦
G;g
e ¸ 0, the ¯rm necessarily o®ers a wage
wg
e < yG < ^ wg
19In consequence, B-type mismatched workers will not be laid o®. As ¯rms cannot prevent mismatch,
the menu of contracts that elicits private information cannot be implemented. In order to ensure
the participation of G-type workers, the ¯rm has to give up the highest information rent to B-type
workers who get an additional utility
u(wb
e) ¡ u(bB) = [u(bG) ¡ u(bB)]
The di®erence between the two thresholds is given by:
¹ F2 ¡ ¹ F1 =
yG ¡ bG
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
The range of values for which the ¯rm has to give up an information rent to high productive workers
is given by the discounted gap between the output produced in employment and home production. In
consequence, for bG < yG, the ¯rm has room to implement a menu of contracts even with ¯ring costs.
4.2.3 Separating vs. pooling contracts
The analysis suggested that for a high level of ¯ring costs, a separating menu of contracts cannot
be implemented. We ask whether or not for an intermediate value of the EPL, ¹ F1 < F · ¹ F2, the
separating contract that gives all the workers an information rent is optimal with respect to the pooling
contract. The pooling contract is the one that o®ers a single wage we to both high-productive and
low-productive workers.





e + (1 ¡ Ã)¦B
e
¾







Under full commitment, the labor contract is not assumed to be renegotiated but employers have the
possibility to ¯re a worker who has been revealed to be low productive by paying a dismissal cost F.
The expected value of a job occupied by a B-type worker satis¯es:
¦B
e = yB ¡ we + ¯(1 ¡ s)maxf¦0B
e ;¡Fg (31)
with ¦0B
e the expected pro¯t from job continuation:
¦0B
e = yB ¡ we + ¯(1 ¡ s)¦0B
e (32)
20The condition under which a B-type worker will be ¯red is thus given by:
yB ¡ we
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
< ¡F (33)
The optimal contract does not depend on the ¯rm's separation decision. It yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 The optimal wage we is the one that ensures G-type workers participation. It entails
• The same utility as unemployed for G-type worker, u(we) = u(bG) =) we = bG
• A positive information rent to the B-type worker: we > bB
• The dismissal of B-type workers for F < ¹ F1.
Let's now consider values of ¯ring costs in the range of ¹ F1 and ¹ F2. We derive the di®erence between
the expected pro¯t ¦E the ¯rm gets when o®ering a menu of contract and when o®ering a pooling
contract. It simpli¯es to:
Ã
©
bG ¡ yB ¡ [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
ª
+ (1 ¡ Ã)(bG ¡ wb
e)
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
(34)




[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
which has positive value when the optimal separating contract is such that bB < wb
e < bG. We expect
the menu of contracts to be preferred to the pooling contract for values of ¯ring costs close to ¹ F1. The
pro¯t gap is reduced by and increase in F. We show that:
Proposition 6 There is a threshold value ~ F such that ¹ F1 < ~ F · ¹ F2, above which the pooling contract
will be preferred to the separating one. It satis¯es:
~ F =
bG ¡ ÃyB ¡ (1 ¡ Ã)wb
e
Ã[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
(35)
As wb
e depends on the level of ¯ring costs, F, a more stringent EPL also reduces the threshold ~ F.
To sum up, for intermediate levels of the EPL, the ¯rm faces a trade-o® between conceding a higher
wage level w
g
e to good workers that would induce bad workers to choose the contract designed for
them as they will be dismissed if not, or conceding the same wage to bad workers as to good workers.
They compare the loss in ¦
G;g
e a menu of contracts would imply with the loss in ¦B
e a pooling contract







Ã2[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
< 0
For a given level of ¯ring costs, ¯rms will be more likely to increase w
g
e in order to implement a menu
of separating contracts if the fraction of good workers is low. The higher the fraction of bad workers
(1 ¡ Ã), the higher the threshold ~ F.
5 The labor market equilibrium
We ¯rst describes how job creation decisions are taken, given the labor contracts o®ered new entrants
and to revealed experienced workers.
5.1 Job creation decisions
Firms decide to what type of workers to direct their search. The expected pro¯ts of an un¯lled position
directed either to a G-type or to a B-type revealed worker are given by:
¦v




















The expected value of a vacancy directed to new entrants satis¯es:
¦v
E = ¡c + ¯
½




with ¦E, the average expected pro¯t of a job occupied by a new entrant whose type is unknown. It
can be written without loss of generality as:
¦E = Ã¦
G;g
1;e + (1 ¡ Ã)¦
B;b
2;e (39)
This value depends on the optimal labor contract the ¯rm o®ers, which is either a single contract or
a menu of separating contracts. As there is free entry, the values of a vacancy reduce to zero. The
tightness µi
R and µE are such that the expected cost of posting a vacancy equals the expected return










225.2 Labor market °ows
Lt denotes the labor force at period t, which is growing at rate ±, so that:
Lt+1 = (1 + ±)Lt
The populations of G-type and B-type new entrants are thus given by respectively Ã±Lt and (1¡Ã)±Lt.





Lt denotes the mass of i-type unemployed workers who have private information and
search for their ¯rst job,
• ui
R;t denotes the mass of i-type unemployed workers who have been revealed previously in em-
ployment,
• ni
e;t denotes the mass of i-type new workers who occupied their ¯rst job,
• ni
r;t denotes the mass of i-type experienced workers, which type was known by ¯rms at the time
of meeting.
The dynamic of the employment is given by the following set of equations:
uG
E;t+1(1 + ±) = Ã± + [1 ¡ p(µE;t)]uG
E;t (42)
uB
E;t+1(1 + ±) = (1 ¡ Ã)± + [1 ¡ p(µE;t)]uB
E;t (43)
ni
e;t+1(1 + ±) = p(µE;t)ui
E;t + (1 ¡ s)ni
e;t (44)
ui
R;t+1(1 + ±) = s(ni
e;t + ni




r;t+1(1 + ±) = p(µi
R;t)ui
R;t + (1 ¡ s)ni
r;t (46)
Unemployment at the labor market entry is composed by the °ow of new entrants starting their
search in t + 1 and by workers who did not ¯nd a job at period t. Workers who are separated from
their job fall into the unemployment pool of revealed workers and ¯nd a new job with probability
p(µi
R).
5.3 The labor market equilibrium




















r for i = fG;Bg and j = fg;bg such that
1. The free entry conditions given by equations 40 and 41 are veri¯ed,
2. The optimal wage contracts maximize the average expected discounted pro¯t of a new job and
guarantee both participation and incentive compatibility due to adverse selection that arises at
the labor market entry,



























By preventing the ¯rms from implementing a menu of separating contract, the EPL reduces the
expected pro¯t of a job at the labor market entry and thus moderates job creations. The labor
market integration process of young workers should be smoother in the absence of any dismissal costs.
However, as workers get an information rent, they should be better o® with a strict EPL.
6 Numerical exercises
This section provides a numerical exercise to illustrate the e®ects of the labor market institutions
on the optimal wage contract the ¯rm o®ers to new entrants under adverse selection. It allow us to
investigate the optimal wage pro¯le by relaxing the assumption of a constant wage and to analyze the
implications on the youth labor market integration process.
6.1 Computation
The month is taken as unit of time. We adopt the following Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
m(uk;vk) = mu'v1¡', which is assumed to be identical for all matching processes. We choose an
intermediate value for the relative risk aversion parameter: ¾ = 2.
The productivity of G-type workers is normalized to 1 while the values of yB and Ã are computed
arbitrarily. Adverse selection should emerge at the labor market entry for workers who have the same
education level. The di®erences in workers abilities should be low so we assume a productivity gap of
10%. The fraction of G-type workers is ¯xed to 75%. Assuming a lower fraction would imply that for
higher levels of EPL, the expected pro¯t at the labor market entry, ¦E, has negative value such that
no vacancies will be posted.
Then, the value of b that determines the unemployment income is computed so that ¯rms will be
able to dismiss B-type mismatched workers for F = 0. In this case, the optimal single wage w
g
e
was demonstrated to equal the value of bG. As ¯rms will dismiss B-type mismatched workers if
yB < w
g
e · yG, we choose b = 0:95 > yB. Such a value implies that current pro¯ts will be quite low.
However, it allows us ensure that the case where B-type mismatched workers are ¯red emerges. Then
24we illustrate the e®ects of ¯ring costs on the labor market.
Finally, the cost of a vacancy c is computed so that the probabilities to ¯ll a vacancy q(µi
R) are in the
range of [0:71;0:79], which is consistent with (Den Hann W.J., Ramey G. and Watson J. 2000). The
e±ciency parameter of the matching function m allows us to reproduce an average job ¯nding rate
for revealed workers which is close to the monthly transition rate from unemployment to employment
observed in France in 2002 for the youth population: 12.44%. The exogenous destruction rate is ¯xed
to the monthly transition rate from employment to unemployment observed for the same population:
2.92%. The calibration is reported in Table 2. As there are no quantitative estimates of non-severance
dismissal costs, we rely on (Heckman J. and Pages C. 2000) who estimated that e®ective severance
costs for European countries lie in the 1 to 4 month range. Thus, we simulate the model for a set of
values of F between 0 and 4 ¤ w
g
r. According to the calibration, the threshold values of F are:
¹ F1 = 1:62 ¤ wg
r and ¹ F2 = 3:24 ¤ wg
r
Table 1 displays the results for the segment where revealed workers are searching for a job. The
labor contract is such that the expected gains from employment and unemployment are equal. The
job ¯nding rate for high-productive and low-productive workers are respectively 12.54% and 11.29%.
The average unemployment duration under full information is about 8 months.
Table 1: Numerical exercise: Segment where revealed workers a re searching for a job
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































266.2 The case with a constant wage: E®ects of the Employment Protection Legis-
lation
We ¯rst consider the numerical results for the case with a constant wage. Table 3 reports the menu
of contracts the ¯rm can o®er according to the strictness of the EPL while Table 4 summarizes the
equilibrium results. The ¯rst column of Table 4 characterizes the economy under full information. The
equilibrium unemployment rate reaches 19.88%, which is two points higher than the unemployment
rate observed in France in 2002 for the youth population. One should notice that the probability for
new entrants to ¯nd a job di®ers from the probabilities characterizing the experienced workers as it
integrates externalities associated with non directed search. Another way to feature the labor market
entry process under information asymmetry would be to consider that the ¯rms not only designed a
menu of separating contracts to new entrants, but also segment their search. The labor market entry
will be characterized by two tightness values: µi
E for i = fG;Bg. Recall that the paper does not
investigate how to internalize search externalities.
Table 3 reports the menu of contracts the ¯rm can o®er according to the level of ¯ring costs. For
F < ¹ F1, the ¯rms o®er a menu of contracts to new entrants that gives to high productive workers the
wage o®ered under full information while B-type workers get a small information rent of 0.034%. The
information asymmetry reduces the average expected pro¯t of a job at the labor market entry, thereby
reducing job creations. However, the Table 4 suggests that it barely a®ects the unemployment rate
w.r.t the equilibrium under full information. The labor market is not a®ected by in increase in ¯ring
costs as long as the level is lower than ¹ F1: The EPL does not prevent ¯rm from dismissing B-type
mismatched workers while paying G-type workers at their reservation wage.
On the contrary, a higher level of ¯ring costs distorts hiring practices and increases the unemployment
rate. For the highest values of ¯ring costs, F > ¹ F2, ¯rms are unable to implement separating contracts.
Indeed, the threshold ^ wg is higher than the highest level of the output yG. In order to dismiss B-type
mismatched workers, the ¯rm would have to give a wage w
g
e such that the hiring of good workers is
not pro¯table. The ¯rm is constrained to o®er a pooling contract that gives all workers the value of
G-type workers' home production (bG). B-type workers get an information rent of 1.05%, (Table 3).
Let us now consider the intermediate levels of the EPL: ¹ F1 < F < ¹ F2. The ¯rm is able to implement
a menu of contracts that elicits workers' private information by giving up some information rent to
high-productive workers that turns out to be higher than the rent given to low-productive workers.
In consequence, high-productive workers are better o® with intermediate levels of the EPL, while
low-productive workers are better o® with a more stringent EPL, for which ¯rms are not able to
discriminate. Table 3 shows that the optimal wage increases with the level of ¯ring costs. The surplus
of the wage w
g
e strongly reduces the expected pro¯t of a job ¦
G;g
e but allows the ¯rm to dismiss a
B-type mismatched worker. The threshold value of ~ F is about 2:6 ¤ w
g
r. The ¯fth column of table 3
illustrates that for ~ F < F < ¹ F2, the increase in w
g
e the ¯rm has to concede to induce B-type workers
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28a pooling contract reduces the expected pro¯t by only 50% w.r.t the economy under full information.
The optimal contract under adverse selection is thus the pooling one. The economy reaches the same
steady sate as for F > ¹ F2. New entrants spend in average 16 months before getting their ¯rst job
and the unemployment rate of the economy increases by 0.7 points w.r.t the economy under full
information, (Table 4). Finally, the ¯gure 2 illustrates the pro¯les of the optimum wages o®ered to
new entrants and of the aggregate unemployment rate according to the levels of ¯ring costs.
Figure 2: The e®ects of ¯ring costs on the equilibrium wage level and unemployment rate

































































Economy under information asymmetry

























































































































































































































































































































































































































306.3 The optimal wage pro¯le: E®ects of the labor market institutions
We solve numerically the computed model and provide some rough estimates of the optimal wage
pro¯les designed by ¯rms according to the EPL and to the minimum wage. Numerical results are
reported in Table 5.
An increasing wage pro¯le is found to be optimal for both types of workers. For low EPL, high
productive workers are paid initially less than their marginal value while more at the second stage of
employment, as in (Lazear E.P. 1981). However, in our framework as the output is constant, it does
not induce worker's e®ort but prevents mismatch. The contract designed for low-productive workers
is °atter. In order to elicit private information, the ¯rm gives up an information rent in both stages
of employment: wb
e > bB. The lowest values of F do not a®ect the equilibrium as ¯rms remain able to
dismiss mismatched workers, whatever the stage of employment. We observe that designing an upward
sloping wage with tenure barely increases the expected pro¯t ¦E w.r.t to the case where ¯rms are
constrained to o®er a constant wage. As ¯ring costs are low, ¯rms do not have to implement incentive
mechanisms. Then, for high levels of EPL that prevent ¯rms from o®ering a menu of contracts, the
pooling contract is the one that ensures G-type workers participation and gives a constant wage to
all workers. The level of ¯ring costs is such that ¯rms will not be able to dismiss mismatched workers
whatever the wage pro¯le. In consequence, they o®er a constant wage contract.
Intermediate values of ¯ring costs reduce the possibility for the ¯rm to punish mismatched workers.
As expected, ¯rms still o®er an increasing wage to good workers but with a higher growth rate and
a lower initial wage. It allows them to dismiss shirkers once evolution to stage 2 occurs and thus to
reduce the bad worker's incentives to shirk even in presence of ¯ring costs. The dismissal probability
falls from 1 to ¸
g
e. Then, an increase in ¯ring costs from 2 ¤ w
g
r to 2:5 ¤ w
g
r a®ects the economy. The
¯rms raise the wage growth for good workers but the dismissal probability is reduced from 0.25 to
0.13. The incentive for B-type workers to choose the contract designed for G-type workers increases
with ¯ring costs. However, for intermediate levels of EPL, the loss in the expected pro¯t w.r.t the
economy under full information remains lower than 5%, so that job creations and employment are
slightly reduced. Recall that in the case with a constant wage, the loss in the expected pro¯t reached
20 to 40%. Allowing for a time-varying wage increases ¯rm's °exibility and gives room for implement-
ing a self-selection mechanism.
Finally, Table 6 provides a quantitative illustration of the e®ects of a minimum wage on the optimal
employment contract. The value of the minimum wage is ¯xed arbitrarily to 0:88. One can argue that
this value is high. However, a minimum wage lower than bB = 0:855 would not a®ect the economy.
We choose a value bB < ¹ w < bG. Recall that we ¯xed the unemployment income's level in order to
ensures bG > yB, as we are interested in equilibrium in which the ¯rm dismisses a mismatched worker










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32As ¹ w < bG, the minimum wage has no impact on the labor market equilibrium for high level of
¯ring costs. The numerical results suggest that for low values of the EPL, it only a®ects the contract
designed for bad workers without preventing ¯rms from implementing a menu of contracts. As the
expected pro¯t from a job is reduced, ¯rms post less vacancies at the labor market thereby increasing
the unemployment rate. The minimum wage thus mainly a®ects an economy characterized by an
intermediate levels of the EPL. The ¯rm is no longer allowed to o®er the optimal wage pro¯le derived
previously. For F = 2 ¤ w
g
r, the incentives for B-type workers to choose the g-type contract increase
as the dismissal probability falls from 0:25 to 0:167. In consequence, for F = 2w
g
r, the ¯rm is still able
to implement a menu of contracts but the pooling one is preferred.
7 Conclusion
This paper supports the idea that labor markets operate in an environment where adverse selection
mainly appears at the labor market entry, thus making risky the hiring of new entrants. We investigate
the problem of optimal design of employment contracts for an economy characterized by a strict
regulation concerning ¯ring costs and a high level of minimum wage. The theoretical and quantitative
analysis highlighted two threshold values of ¯ring costs. We established that low ¯ring costs do not
a®ect the economy while a strict EPL prevent ¯rms from implementing a menu of contracts as a self-
selection mechanism since ¯rms will be enable to dismiss the shirkers. For intermediate levels of ¯ring
costs, the optimal contract is an upward sloping wage with tenure. Bad workers are not induced to
shirk as if they do, they will be dismissed before gaining access to a higher wage. Firing costs reduces
the dismissal probability thereby increasing the incentives to shirk. In this paper, we considered two
types of workers di®ering in their abilities but producing a constant output. Contrary to the ¯ndings
of (Lazear E.P. 1981), there are no incentives to design a wage according to job tenure under full
information or in the absence of any labor market institutions. A time-varying wage is o®ered to
prevent shirking in the presence of ¯ring costs. We argue that a high level of minimum wage distorts
designing practices only for the intermediate levels of ¯ring costs by a®ecting the implementation of
increasing wage pro¯les. The threshold value of the employment protection legislation above which
¯rms are no longer able to implement a menu of contracts is reduced. Our numerical results suggest
that the labor market institutions that characterized most of the European countries contribute to
the time-consuming integration process of young workers. The average unemployment duration at
the labor market entry could be doubled with minimum wages and high EPL. However, it slightly
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with ¹ the multiplier associated with the participation constraint.
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For an increasing wage pro¯le, the function is decreasing and convex in ¸
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r, while it is increasing and
concave in ¸
j
r for a decreasing wage pro¯le.
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contract is thus de¯ned by a single value w
j
r.
As ¹ 6= 0, the participation constraint is saturated so that u(w
j
r) = u(bi). The optimal contract gives
the worker a wage that equals his unemployment income: w
j
r = bi.
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and to the adverse selection incentive constraints
V G;g
e ¸ V G;b
e (ICG)
V B;g
e ¸ V B;g
e (ICB)
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i = j, which implies (1 ¡ ¯)Ui
R = u(bi). Using this result and equation (25), the net gain from







[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
for i = j
Given the properties of the utility function u(:), (V
i;j
e ¡ Ui
R) is increasing and concave in w
j
e.
The net gain from choosing the right contract to G-type worker is given by:
(V G;g
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e ) is increasing and concave in w
g
e while
decreasing and convex in wb
e.
Finally, the net gain from choosing the right contract to B-type worker di®ers according to the
¯rm's separation decision:
(V B;b





e) + ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(w
g
e) ¡ u(bB)]
[1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]
if B-type mismatched workers are dismissed, and:
(V B;b
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e ) is increasing and concave in wb
e while decreasing and convex in w
g
e, whatever the ¯rm's separation
decision.
We now solve the ¯rm's problem for the two cases.
8.2.1 The case where B-type mismatched workers are retained once revealed
This case emerges for F >
yG¡yB
[1¡¯(1¡s)] as ¯rms are not able to set a wage w
g
e > ^ wg. Indeed, it would
imply w
g




e ) that integrates job continuation.
The ¯rm's problem is the one stated above. The Lagrangian is given by:
L = ¦E + ¹1(V G;g
e ¡ UG
R) + ¹2(V B;b
e ¡ UB
R) + ¹3(V G;g
e ¡ V G;b
e ) + ¹4(V B;b
e ¡ V B;g
e )
with ¹1 and ¹2 the multipliers associated with the participation constraints and with ¹3 and ¹4 the
multipliers associated with the incentive constraints for respectively G-type and B-type workers.
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= 0
It is straightforward that the incentive constraints are saturated: u(w
g
e) ¡ u(wb








40The optimal contract is thus a single value we. Given that bG > bB, the participation constraint for B-
type workers cannot be saturated in order to ensure the participation of G-type workers: we ¸ bG > bB.
Finally, as the expected pro¯t is decreasing in w
j
e, the ¯rst constraint will be saturated: we = bG.
8.2.2 The case where B-type mismatched workers are laid o® once revealed
In order to be able to dismiss B-type mismatched workers, the ¯rm has to o®er a wage w
g
e higher
than the threshold value ^ wg = yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F. This dismissal constraint is added to the ¯rm's
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to the adverse selection incentive constraints
V G;g
e ¸ V G;b
e (ICG)
V B;g
e ¸ V B;g
e (ICB)
and to the dismissal constraint
wg
e ¸ ¹ w
g
e (DC)
The Lagrangian is written as:
L = ¦E + ¹1(V G;g
e ¡ UG
R) + ¹2(V B;b
e ¡ UB
R) + ¹3(V G;g
e ¡ V G;b
e ) + ¹4(V B;b





e ¡ yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
¢
with ¹1, ¹2, ¹3 and ¹4 the multipliers associated with the participation and incentive constraints,
for respectively G-type and B-type workers, and with ¹5 the multiplier associated with the dismissal
constraint.
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= 0
We ¯rst demonstrate that the constraints (PCB) and (ICG) cannot be saturated:
• The participation constraint of B-type workers (PCB) cannot be saturated.
If the constraint (PCB) is saturated, (ICG) cannot be. Indeed, according to (PCG), u(w
g
e) ¡
u(bG) ¸ 0 =) u(w
g
e) ¡ u(bB) > 0. The saturation of (PCB) entails u(wb








As (PCB) is assumed to be saturated, the following equality does hold:
u(wb
e) ¡ u(wg
e) + ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(wg
e) ¡ u(bB)] = [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)][u(wb
e) ¡ u(wg
e)] < 0
As a result, the last optimality condition is not veri¯ed and B-type workers are induced to choose





• The incentive constraint for G-type workers (ICG) cannot be saturated if (PCB) is
not We demonstrated that (PCB) is not saturated thus yielding ¹2 = 0. If the constraint (ICG)
42is saturated, the optimal wage will be a single value, u(w
g
e) = u(wb
e), such that u(wb
e) > u(bB).





+ ¹3 > 0
The incentive constraint (ICB) should be saturated thus implying
u(wb
e) ¡ u(wg
e) = ¡¯(1 ¡ s)[u(wg
e) ¡ u(bB)]
However the left term has null value since (ICG) is assumed to be saturated while the right term
is strictly negative since (PCB) is not.
In consequence, the constraints (PCB) and (ICG) cannot be saturated:
V B;b
e > UB
r and V G;g
e > V G;b
e






=) ¹4 > 0











+ [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]¹4 > 0
We now distinguish two cases according to the saturation of (DC).
1. Assume ¯rst that the dismissal constraint in not saturated: ¹5 = 0.




The optimal menu of contracts satis¯es:
u(wg
e) = u(bG) =) wg
e = bG
u(wb









e) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(wg
e) ¡ u(bB)]
wg
e > yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
According to (DC), this case emerges for bg > yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F.
432. Assume now that the dismissal constraint in saturated:
For bg · yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F, the optimal wage satis¯es w
g
e = ¹ w
g
e.




The optimal menu of contracts satis¯es:
u(wg
e) > u(bG) =) wg
e > bG
u(wb









e) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)[u(wg
e) ¡ u(bB)]
wg
e = yB + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)]F
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